This summary covers the key legal and juridical concepts of the Constitution of the Digital Society within the framework of existing international law. It systematically presents each section of the Constitution, its international legal foundations, relevant international practice, comparative legal analogues, and doctrinal sources.
This work constitutes a comprehensive foundation upon which the project of the Constitution of the Digital Society is built. It demonstrates that, on the basis of existing international legal instruments and precedents, it is possible to form a new intersocietal agreement — an agreement corresponding to the next stage of human development, the era of the digital society.
Such an agreement makes it possible to:
The transition of humanity to a digital society is not accidental but represents the manifestation of long historical waves of development — the so-called Kondratiev cycles, in which each epoch is formed around a new technological paradigm. The contemporary world is entering the sixth wave, defined by information systems, artificial intelligence, global data interaction, and the emergence of digital institutions that become new mechanisms for organizing society.
The modern digital society is formed at the intersection of several intellectual traditions:
· The American School (Norbert Wiener, Mitchell, Kelly) — focused on self-organization, system openness, network structures, and the ethical dimension of information processes.
· The European School (Habermas, Castells, Latour) — emphasizing communicative rationality, the network society, and the interaction between humans, technology, and power.
· Asian Approaches (Japanese and Korean cyber-sociology) — stressing harmony between technological progress, responsibility, and collective interaction.
All these approaches converge on the understanding that the digital era transforms not only the economy or politics, but the very structure of human interaction — from the nature of individual rights to the institutional architecture of the world.
The development of digital civilization cannot be understood outside the context of the Ukrainian school of cybernetics founded by Viktor Glushkov. This school laid the foundations for a systemic vision of the governance of complex social systems, the construction of information models, and the creation of architectures that ensure transparency and predictability of social processes.
Today, this systemic thinking is receiving a new level of realization, drawing upon the principles of the Unified State Automated System (USAS / OGAS) — a historical project that became one of the world’s first attempts to create a comprehensive digital institutional infrastructure. OGAS is not regarded as a mechanical solution of the past, but as a predecessor of the modern architecture of digital polycentric institutions, which form the foundation of a new international order.
Today, the development of the digital society goes beyond technical or social innovation and enters the domain of a new model of global coordination and security.
Based on the Ukrainian cybernetic tradition and contemporary models of digital interaction, the Project of the New System of International Security is being formed. It proposes:
· a transition from monopolar and militarily dominated systems to digital polycentric institutions;
· the creation of a global Digital Institutional Platform ensuring transparency, trust, and predictability of interaction among states, organizations, and citizens;
· the introduction of personal digital sovereignty, granting individuals a new level of legal status in the global order;
· the construction of a peace-building model that reduces incentives for conflict and economically rewards cooperation.
Thus, the digital society is not merely a technology of the future, but a new form of global organization in which individuals acquire expanded rights and responsibilities, institutions function on the basis of ethical algorithms, and the international system becomes more stable, predictable, and capable of ensuring long-term peace.
Essence: the formation of a digital architecture based on human sovereignty, polycentric governance, and ethical algorithms.
International legal sources:
· WSIS Geneva Declaration (2003) — principles of the information society;
· UN Global Digital Compact (2024, draft) — framework for digital development;
· OECD Digital Government Principles — standards of digital architecture;
· UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights — digital responsibility of actors.
Key provision: the digital environment constitutes a new form of social organization entitled to its own institutions and rules, provided they do not contradict international law.
The formation of a digital society requires the creation of a coherent architecture in which the central source of authority and responsibility is the human individual. This approach is consistent with international instruments defining the principles of digital and informational development.
First, the WSIS Geneva Declaration (2003) establishes a fundamental understanding of the information society as one based on human dignity, universal rights, and access to digital resources. These principles underlie a digital architecture in which the individual is a subject rather than an object of regulation.
Second, the provisions of the UN Global Digital Compact (2024, draft) recognize the need for global institutional coherence in the digital sphere, including transparency, accountability, and fair data governance. This framework reinforces the concept of polycentric governance introduced by the New System of International Security as a new model of international interaction in the digital environment.
Third, the OECD Digital Government Principles define standards for digital architecture, including openness, interoperability, cyber resilience, and technological neutrality. They confirm that digital institutions must be systematically organized and legally coherent.
Fourth, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights establish standards of responsibility for private and institutional actors in the digital sphere, particularly regarding respect for human rights and the prevention of violations arising from algorithmic decision-making. This directly correlates with the concept of the New System of International Security based on ethical algorithms as the core mechanism of digital governance.
In summary, the digital environment emerges as a new form of social organization capable of generating its own institutions, rules, and coordination mechanisms. However, these institutions must operate within the framework of international law, ensuring the primacy of human rights, personal digital sovereignty, and transparency in decision-making. This forms the basis for the development of a polycentric architecture of the digital society that combines systemic autonomy with universal legal standards.
Essence: the digital person is the bearer of autonomous, natural, and inalienable sovereignty.
International legal foundations:
· Article 1 ICCPR — the right of peoples to self-determination, doctrinally interpreted as individual autonomy;
· Article 17 ICCPR — protection of privacy;
· UN Compilation on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (A/HRC/27/37);
· EU Self-Sovereign Identity Framework — international SSI doctrine.
Core idea: the individual retains full control over data, identity, digital behavior, and algorithmic traces.
The concept of digital sovereignty of the individual is grounded in the recognition that the person is the primary bearer of autonomy, freedom, and control over their own digital identity. In the digital age, this means that individuals possess an inalienable right to determine how their data, algorithmic profiles, behavioral traces, and digital interactions are used.
This approach is firmly rooted in international law.
First, Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which affirms the right of peoples to self-determination, is interpreted in contemporary doctrine as extending to individual autonomy. In the digital dimension, this is understood as the right of the individual to self-determination in relation to their informational and algorithmic presence.
Second, Article 17 of the ICCPR guarantees the protection of privacy, personal data, and freedom from arbitrary interference. In the digital environment, this includes:
· control over personal data,
· determination of the conditions of its transfer,
· protection against algorithmic discrimination and unauthorized profiling.
Third, the UN document "The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age" (A/HRC/27/37) reflects modern international practice, according to which privacy is not merely data protection, but a right to autonomous digital identity, the determination of the boundaries of one’s digital presence, and protection from opaque algorithms.
Fourth, the international doctrine of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI), developed within the European Union, emphasizes the principle that the owner of identity is the individual themselves — not the state, not a corporation, and not a digital platform. SSI guarantees:
· self-management of the digital profile,
· data minimization,
· independence from centralized registries.
In this context, digital sovereignty of the individual means that the person retains full and inalienable control over:
· personal data and digital property,
· digital identification,
· algorithmic representations of behavior,
· the right to exit the digital system,
· the right to accessibility, accuracy, and explainability of algorithms affecting personal autonomy.
This establishes a new legal status of the individual in the digital society — the status of a digitally sovereign person, who constitutes the core of the polycentric architecture and the primary bearer of digital rights and obligations.
Essence: the transformation of human rights into the digital environment.
Sources of international law:
· ICCPR (freedom of expression, privacy, protection against arbitrariness);
· Convention 108+ (Council of Europe) — international data protection standard;
· GDPR (a benchmark for global digital law);
· UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights — information corporations as "duty bearers".
New rights: the right to digital identity, the right to disconnect, the right to an explainable algorithm.
The rights of the digital person reflect the evolution of classical human rights into a new dimension — a space in which the individual interacts through data, algorithms, digital profiles, and polycentric institutions. In such an environment, traditional rights do not disappear but are supplemented by new forms aimed at protecting autonomy and human dignity in digital life.
First, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) remains the foundation:
· freedom of expression (Article 19) encompasses digital communication, social networks, and the right of access to digital information;
· Article 17 guarantees protection against arbitrary interference with privacy, which in the digital context includes control over data, algorithmic profiling, and the use of behavioral signals;
· Article 9 (protection against arbitrariness) extends to automated decision-making systems.
Second, Council of Europe Convention 108+ is the only universal international treaty of a global nature in the field of data protection. It establishes the principles of:
· lawfulness of data processing,
· proportionality,
· accuracy and purpose limitation,
·
accountability of data-processing entities.
Within a polycentric institution, these principles form the basis of
algorithmic ethics.
Third, the GDPR serves as a practical reference point for global digital law. It enshrines:
· the right of access to data,
· the right to data portability,
· the right to be forgotten,
·
the right to object to automated decision-making.
These norms constitute the structural framework for the rights of the digital
person as transferred to the level of new polycentric structures.
Fourth, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights establish that not only states but also digital corporations are "duty bearers" — entities obligated to protect human rights in the sphere of data, algorithms, and digital platforms. For polycentric institutions, this introduces a fundamentally new norm: any entity that governs data or algorithms assumes obligations toward individual rights.
In this context, new rights of the digital era emerge, which are necessary within a polycentric architecture:
1. The Right to Digital Identity
The individual has the right to define their digital presence, methods of
verification, the structure of their digital profile, and the limits of access
to it.
2. The Right to Disconnect
Recognized in EU labor law and extended into the digital space as the right of
individuals to control the intensity of digital interaction and avoid coerced
permanent online existence.
3. The Right to Algorithmic Explainability
Anchored as a principle in the GDPR and UN AI practice, guaranteeing that any
automated decision affecting an individual must be transparent, explainable,
and subject to oversight.
In summary, the polycentric institution creates a legal environment in which the digital person not only enjoys fundamental human rights but also acquires a specific set of new digital rights aimed at safeguarding autonomy and security under conditions of neural-network-based, algorithmic, and tokenized interaction.
Essence: responsible behavior in the digital space.
International legal references:
· Tallinn Manual 2.0 (principles of conduct in cyberspace);
· UN GGE / OEWG Reports — expected responsibility of actors in the cyber environment;
· Corfu Channel Case (ICJ) — the principle of prevention of harm.
Principle: the freedom of the individual may not violate the rights of other digital subjects or international security.
Section IV establishes the duties of the digital person within the digital society as a specific form of legal personality. Although international law traditionally regulates state conduct, since the early 2010s it has increasingly recognized the role of non-state actors in ensuring the stability of cyberspace (UN GGE, OEWG).
The legal approach of this section is based on the international law principle that:
The freedom of a subject may not be exercised to cause harm to other subjects or to international security.
This principle originates from general international law (due diligence, non-aggression, non-intervention) and is applied to the digital environment through cyber security doctrine.
Tallinn Manual 2.0 is the most authoritative scholarly-legal document systematizing the application of international law to cyber operations. Although it is not a treaty, it reflects expert consensus on existing international law norms.
For Section IV, the following provisions are key:
(a) Rule 4 — Duty to prevent harm (Due Diligence)
A state (or other subject) must not allow its territory or resources to be used
for acts that cause harm to others.
In the context of the digital person, this translates into the requirement that:
· a digital person must not allow their account, keys, digital property, or resources to be used for actions that harm other digital subjects or infrastructure.
(b) Rules 92–95 — Responsibility of non-state actors
The Tallinn Manual emphasizes that the conduct of private individuals may have
significant international legal consequences. This provides a legal basis for
incorporating duties of the digital person into the Charter of the Digital
Society.
UN GGE Reports (2013, 2015, 2021)
These documents articulate principles directly relevant to Section IV:
· states and non-state actors must refrain from actions that could destabilize cyberspace;
· actors must act responsibly, predictably, and transparently;
· cyberspace must function without harm to the rights of others.
OEWG Reports (2021–2023)
These reports articulate, for the first time, an internationally agreed
concept:
All actors, including private individuals, bear responsibility for maintaining the stability of the digital environment.
Accordingly, Section IV reflects a generally accepted norm: individual digital behavior is part of global cyber stability.
In the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice established that:
A state is obliged not to allow its territory to be used for acts that cause harm to another state.
This principle became the foundation of the no-harm rule, which also extends to cyberspace.
In the digital society, it applies as follows:
· a digital person must prevent their digital assets, tools, or channels from becoming sources of harm to other subjects;
· they must take reasonable measures to secure their digital environment.
This fully corresponds to due diligence in international law.
The core principle of Section IV is:
The freedom of the digital person is limited by the rights of others and by the requirements of international security.
This principle derives from multiple international sources:
· UN Charter, Articles 1 and 2 — prohibition of threats and use of force, respect for the rights of others;
· Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 29 — rights may be limited to secure the rights of others and public order;
· Tallinn Manual, Rule 4 — freedom of activity in cyberspace is limited by the obligation not to cause harm;
· UN GGE — the principle of responsible behavior;
· Corfu Channel Case — the universal prohibition on using controlled domains (here: digital identity) to cause harm.
Accordingly, the limits of digital freedom are legally grounded and flow from general international law.
Based on international legal analogies, Section IV produces the following legal effects:
(a) Duty to refrain from digital offenses
Including prohibitions on:
· harmful digital actions;
· manipulations that violate the digital rights of others;
· interference with the functioning of the Digital Institutional Platform (DIP) or its institutions.
(b) Duty to ensure cyber hygiene and secure use of
resources
As an analogue of due diligence:
· protecting keys, access credentials, and digital assets;
· preventing their use by third parties for violations.
(c) Duty to cooperate with polycentric institutions
This corresponds to the principle of international cooperation in cybersecurity
(UN GGE, OEWG).
Section IV is fully aligned with international norms and reflects the following logic:
1. The no-harm principle;
2. Due diligence under the Tallinn Manual;
3. Recognition of responsibility of non-state actors by UN GGE/OEWG;
4. The balance between rights and security — freedom is not absolute.
Thus, Section IV has a solid international legal foundation and integrates the digital person into a system of rights and duties analogous to internationally recognized standards of responsible behavior in cyberspace.
(Digital Polycentric Institution — DPI)
Essence: the DPI is a legally significant form of personal identity.
Foundations in international law:
· General theory of the legal personality of international organizations (ICJ, Reparation for Injuries case);
· OECD Digital Identity Guidelines;
· ITU standards on digital identifiers.
Principle: a digital polycentric institution that defines the sovereignty of the digital person may possess its own rights, obligations, and jurisdictional guarantees.
Section V introduces the Digital Polycentric Institution (DPI) as a legally significant form of collective identity and a bearer of personal sovereignty.
The DPI functions as the digital "legal home" of the individual — the institution through which digital rights, obligations, economic participation, and ethical and algorithmic guarantees are realized.
By its nature, the DPI occupies an intermediate position between:
· the individual (the primary bearer of sovereignty),
· the digital platform (the technological layer),
· international structures (the source of legitimacy and protection).
In international law, comparable status is attributed to:
· international organizations,
· associated subjects of international law,
· institutions with functional legal personality.
The DPI concept is grounded in these doctrines.
In Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice articulated the principle that:
An entity may possess international legal personality if such personality is necessary for the fulfillment of its functions.
This precedent establishes that:
· legal personality is not limited to states;
· it may belong to any institutional form capable of performing functions in the international sphere;
· its scope is determined by necessity and purpose rather than formal designation.
Applied to the DPI, this means that:
· the DPI may acquire the status of an institution with special legal personality in the digital environment;
· it may conclude agreements, adopt rules, and guarantee the rights of digital persons;
· it may be a party to proceedings within digital jurisdiction.
This fully accords with ICJ doctrine.
The OECD, in its:
· Digital Identity Guidelines (2023),
·
Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies,
recognizes that:
· digital identity is not merely an attribute of the individual but an institutional system requiring separate legal subjectivity;
· digital identity systems must operate as independent operators with their own duties and responsibilities.
This directly aligns with the DPI concept, in which:
· the institution acts as the operator of personal sovereignty;
· performs functions of authentication, rights protection, and digital property management;
· possesses the authority to establish internal rules, procedures, and ethical algorithms.
Thus, OECD standards provide an international legal basis for the DPI as an autonomous digital identity institution.
The ITU develops global standards for digital identification, including:
· ITU-T X.1254 (identity management framework),
· ITU-T X.1142 (identity assurance),
· ITU-T F.746 series (trusted digital ecosystems),
· the Unified Digital Identifier (UDI) concept.
These standards establish principles of:
· institutional autonomy of digital identity systems,
· polycentricity (multiple equal operators),
· international interoperability and cross-border jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the DPI may function as a global digital identity institution with a unified, standardized architecture recognized within international technical norms.
Based on the above international legal sources, the DPI acquires the following elements of legal status:
The right to adopt internal norms
Like international organizations:
· the DPI may adopt rules, standards, and ethical algorithms;
· define models of digital behavior and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
The right to conclude digital agreements
Analogous to the functions of the UN, WTO, and EU:
· concluding agreements with other institutions, platforms, and states;
· ensuring cross-border validity of digital identity.
The right to act on behalf of the digital person in
the digital environment
Comparable to:
· diplomatic protection of nationals,
· representation by international organizations of states or individuals.
The obligation to comply with international law
Including:
· respect for human rights,
· algorithmic transparency,
· personal data protection (GDPR, Convention 108+).
Jurisdictional guarantees
The DPI may:
· possess internal jurisdiction (digital dispute-resolution mechanisms);
· be subject to review before digital tribunals of the Digital Institutional Platform.
Thus, the DPI is an institutional bearer of personal sovereignty endowed with genuine legal powers.
An institution may acquire autonomous legal personality when this is required for the effective realization of individual rights and personal sovereignty in the digital environment.
This principle is consistent with:
· the Reparation for Injuries doctrine (ICJ),
· international digital identity standards (OECD, ITU),
· concepts of multi-level digital jurisdiction.
Section V has a strong international legal foundation because it:
· relies on the ICJ doctrine of functional legal personality;
· complies with contemporary OECD digital identity recommendations;
· aligns with ITU standards on digital identifiers and cyberspace;
· establishes a new model of personal sovereignty through an institution endowed with its own rights and guarantees.
This makes the DPI a unique, globally applicable, and internationally legitimate model of institutionalized digital sovereignty of the individual.
Their legal personality is consistent with:
The digital society forms a new paradigm of property relations
in which data, algorithms, digital identity, and institutional cross-signals
acquire the characteristics of independent legal objects. Under these
conditions, digital property becomes a key element of personal sovereignty,
economic interaction, and international security. Its regulation must be based
on international standards of data protection, human rights, innovative
approaches to intellectual property, and principles of responsible digital
governance.
This Part defines the legal, technological, and institutional foundations of
digital property, including mechanisms of control, transfer, protection, and
use within a polycentric digital ecosystem.
Essence: the formation of a digital property regime as a distinct class of rights.
International sources:
· WIPO Internet Treaties (1996)
· TRIPS Agreement
· OECD Blockchain Policy Principles
· UNCTAD Digital Economy Report
Key point: digital property is not limited to data; it also includes rights to algorithms, digital assets, one’s own DPIs, patterns and replications, sub-platforms, and institutional shares.
Section VII introduces a legal regime of digital property as an autonomous class of rights that goes beyond the classical approach to intellectual property. Unlike traditional objects, digital assets exist in the form of data, algorithms, behavioral models, institutional structures, and dynamic replications—elements that have operational significance in the digital society and digital economy.
·
WIPO Internet Treaties (WCT and WPPT, 1996)
Establish a framework for protecting digital works, technological protection
measures, and rights management information, directly supporting the concept of
inalienable rights to one’s own digital data and content.
·
TRIPS Agreement (1994)
Sets minimum international standards for intellectual property protection. The
principle of technology neutrality allows its provisions to be interpreted as
extending to algorithms, software structures, and digital institutions.
·
OECD Blockchain Policy Principles (2021)
Confirm that digital assets may have independent legal status, including
tokenized rights, digital participation shares, and decentralized institutional
components.
·
UNCTAD Digital Economy Report
Recognizes data and digital platforms as key resources of the global economy
and emphasizes the need for new mechanisms for benefit-sharing and control over
digital assets.
This section broadens the traditional concept of property to include:
· data as structured and unstructured digital objects;
· algorithms as products of intellectual activity and decision-making tools;
· digital assets, including digital contracts, digital accounts, and structural units within the DIP;
· institutional shares in Digital Polycentric Institutions (DPIs);
· patterns and replications as operational behavioral signals in the digital society;
· sub-platforms as institutionalized modules of digital architecture;
· rights to one’s own digital institution (the right to own, manage, terminate, or modify one’s DPI).
Thus, digital property encompasses not only information but also institutions, structures, and behavioral algorithms that define personal digital sovereignty.
1. Expansion of legal personality:
The individual acquires a full set of rights to their digital ecosystem,
including the digital institution and assets created through algorithmic
activity.
2. Functional nature of rights:
Ownership includes control, access, transfer, alienation, licensing, and
institutional structuring of assets.
3. Departure from the territorial principle:
Digital property exists in a polycentric environment and is subject to
functional rather than geographic jurisdiction.
4. Enhanced role of ethical algorithms:
DPIs and the DIP serve as guarantors of a fair and predictable property regime,
in accordance with digital patterns and replications.
Section VII lays the foundation for a new digital-society economy in which property is no longer limited to material or classical intangible assets, but encompasses entire institutional models, algorithmic dynamics, and digital structures owned by the individual as part of their sovereignty.
Essence: a mechanism for fair distribution of digital value.
International sources:
· ILO Social Protection Floors
· UN SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities)
· OECD Basic Income Studies
· UBI models of Finland, Canada, and Spain — international practices
Concept: CPI is a legal mechanism derived from the right to equitable development (Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986).
Section VIII introduces the concept of Citizen Passive Income as a fundamental mechanism for the fair distribution of value created by the digital society, digital institutions, and the digital economy. Unlike classical social transfers, CPI is not assistance but a right arising from personal digital sovereignty and inherent participation in the creation of the digital ecosystem.
·
ILO Social Protection Floors (2012):
Recognize every person’s right to basic universal income guarantees, regardless
of employment. CPI is a direct evolution of this principle in the digital
environment.
·
UN SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities):
Emphasizes the need for mechanisms ensuring inclusive economic participation.
CPI fulfills this function in digital architecture.
·
OECD Basic Income Studies:
Comparative analyses show that universal payments increase social stability and
economic participation.
·
Practical UBI Models (Finland, Canada,
Spain):
Demonstrate reductions in poverty and increased economic activity—outcomes
applicable to higher-order digital ecosystems.
·
Declaration on the Right to Development
(1986):
Article 1 affirms everyone’s right to participate in and benefit from
development. CPI operationalizes this right in the digital society.
The central legal logic of CPI is that every digital person generates value in the digital society, even without direct economic activity. This is due to:
1. Digital presence creates value:
Existence alone strengthens platforms and polycentric institutions.
2. Universal network effect:
Ecosystem value grows with each participant (Metcalfe’s Law).
3. Digital infrastructure depends on digital demography:
Similar to international organizations where membership has value regardless of
activity.
International law provides three arguments:
1. Equality and non-discrimination (ICCPR, UDHR):
Participation in development cannot depend on employment, abilities, status, or
productivity.
2. Universality of social protection (ILO SPF):
Social minimums must be independent of activity. CPI is a collective share of
digital value.
3. Right to development:
Development is a shared resource; its outcomes are distributed equally.
CPI is:
· an inalienable right of every digital person;
· equal for all;
· independent of income sources or activity;
· part of digital sovereignty;
· an element of functional digital citizenship.
Within a digital ecosystem operating through patterns and replications:
· CPI stabilizes the digital economy;
· serves as an equality instrument;
· functions as a signal within the neurochain;
· legitimizes digital personalities institutionally.
CPI is thus a legal mechanism expanding digital human rights and guaranteeing each digital person a basic share in the common digital infrastructure and its outcomes.
Essence: models of wealth redistribution in the digital economy.
Sources:
· UN Human Development Reports
· OECD Wealth Distribution Studies
· SDGs 1, 8, 9, 10
Principle: access to one’s DPI ensures receipt of citizen digital income and contribution-based income.
Section IX defines mechanisms for forming and distributing the income of a digital person in a polycentric digital society. Unlike traditional economic models, digital value arises from participation in institutions, creation of patterns and replications, activity within the neurochain, and involvement in sustainable development projects.
·
UNDP Human Development Reports:
Recognize participatory value beyond labor.
·
OECD Wealth Distribution Studies:
Show that intangible assets and data are primary wealth sources.
·
SDGs 1, 8, 9, 10:
Frame poverty reduction, dignified participation, innovation, and inequality
reduction.
There are two income classes:
1. Universal digital citizen income (CPI):
Equal for all, based on sovereignty rather than activity.
2. Contribution-based income:
Linked to digital asset creation, institutional activity, pattern and algorithm
development, project participation, and institutional ownership.
The DPI acts as:
· a digital legal shell;
· a functional institutional form;
· a channel for monetizing participation;
· a ledger of created value;
· access to future income distribution.
In essence, the DPI is a digital institutional wallet, equity portfolio, and legal form combined.
Based on:
· the right to development;
· equality of opportunity;
· proportional participation in value creation.
Digital income is:
· a right, not a privilege;
· part of digital sovereignty;
· a form of institutional citizenship;
· a new category of value in high-tech polycentric systems.
Section IX establishes:
· transparent distribution formulas;
· protected income channels via DPIs;
· a balance of equality and incentives;
· algorithmic, not political or market-based, regulation.
This enables a fair, inclusive, and resilient digital-society economy consistent with international human rights and information-justice standards.
The Digital Institutional Platform (DIP) constitutes the foundational architecture of the digital society, ensuring legal personality, interaction, and regulation of digital persons and polycentric institutions. It integrates mechanisms of digital law, asset governance, algorithmic control, and ethical governance, creating functional channels for the realization of personal sovereignty, distribution of digital income, governance of Digital Polycentric Institutions (DPIs), and interaction with external state and international structures.
The DIP provides:
· legal and technological infrastructure for digital society;
· regulation of digital contracts and algorithms in accordance with international standards (OECD Digital Government Principles, UN Global Digital Compact);
· monitoring and control of digital assets, DPIs, and income flows;
· stability of the digital economy through polycentric governance and ethical algorithms;
· a platform for international interaction, integrating the rights of the digital person into global processes.
Thus, the DIP serves as the core of digital sovereignty, polycentric governance, and the legal framework of the emerging digital civilization.
Essence: The DIP as an
institutional jurisdiction within digital space.
Legal sources:
· UN OEWG — norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace;
· Tallinn Manual 2.0;
· Budapest Convention on Cybercrime;
· ECtHR case law on internet freedom (Delfi AS v. Estonia).
The DIP performs the function of a "digital constitutional jurisdiction."
Chapter X defines the Digital Institutional Platform (DIP) as an autonomous space of digital law in which digital persons and polycentric institutions exercise their rights, obligations, and legal personality. The DIP functions as a digital constitutional jurisdiction, ensuring legal stability, security, and ethical norms in cyberspace.
·
UN OEWG Reports (2013–2025)
Establish fundamental principles of responsible behavior of states and other
actors in cyberspace, forming the basis of digital governance norms.
·
Tallinn Manual 2.0 (2017)
Provides a doctrinal framework for the application of international law in cyberspace,
adaptable to digital institutions within the DIP.
·
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001)
Sets standards for criminalization of cybercrime and mechanisms of
international cooperation for protecting digital infrastructure.
·
ECtHR jurisprudence (Delfi AS v. Estonia,
2015)
Recognizes the balance between freedom of expression and responsibility in the
digital environment, relevant for regulating digital persons and algorithms
within the DIP.
The DIP acts as a digital constitutional jurisdiction that ensures:
1. legal status of digital persons and DPIs, defining rights, obligations, and operational boundaries;
2. regulation of digital contracts, algorithms, and data under ethical and international legal standards;
3. protection mechanisms for digital rights and accountability in cyberspace;
4. jurisdictional guarantees for resolving disputes among digital persons, institutions, and external state or international actors;
5. institutional implementation of international law principles within internal digital architecture, ensuring stability and predictability.
· supremacy of digital law;
· responsibility of each digital subject;
· proportionality of restrictions and controls;
· accessibility and transparency of rules and procedures.
Chapter X emphasizes that the DIP is not merely a technological or administrative platform—it functions as a digital constitution, integrating international legal principles, ethical algorithms, and polycentric governance mechanisms, thereby ensuring digital sovereignty, effective DPI governance, and global legitimacy of digital society.
Essence: Power derives
from individuals, not from the state.
International analogues:
· UN Charter — origin of authority from peoples;
· separation of powers in international organizations (UN, EU);
· monitoring structures (OECD, Council of Europe).
The DIP represents an institutional balance between ethical algorithms and the will of digital persons.
Chapter XI emphasizes the principle of polycentric power in digital society, where authority originates from the sovereignty of digital persons rather than from states or traditional institutions. This model ensures ethical and legitimate governance of the DIP through the interaction of digital citizens and algorithmic mechanisms.
· UN Charter (1945) — authority derives from peoples, forming the basis for digital sovereignty.
· Governance models of international organizations (UN, EU) — examples of polycentric institutional balance.
· Monitoring and oversight bodies (OECD, CoE) — standards of transparency, accountability, and ethical responsibility applied to algorithmic governance.
The DIP acts as a balance of power where:
1. digital persons form the legitimate source of authority;
2. ethical algorithms ensure equality, proportionality, and predictability;
3. distribution of powers between DPIs and digital persons maintains equilibrium;
4. accountability aligns governance with international standards;
5. human–algorithm synergy guarantees rights, security, and system stability.
· digital popular sovereignty;
· polycentric decentralization of power;
· ethical governance;
· transparency and accountability;
· integration with international law.
Chapter XI establishes a new model of power in the digital society, ensuring legitimacy, protection of digital rights, effective polycentric governance, and integration of digital sovereignty into global processes.
Part IV is devoted to the formation of a neurolaw space integrating digital law, artificial intelligence, algorithmic governance, and ethical principles. It defines rules for interaction among digital persons, polycentric institutions, and technological systems within a next-generation digital society.
Neurolaw functions as the legal and ethical framework of technological civilization, integrating international legal standards, sustainable development principles, and human rights in the digital technology domain. It provides:
· regulation of AI and automated systems;
· protection of digital persons and their rights in cyberspace;
· legal foundations for governing digital institutions and the DIP;
· mechanisms for adapting to technological innovation without violating international standards or ethical norms.
Thus, Part IV bridges law, technology, and ethics, forming the basis of a secure and sustainable digital civilization.
Essence: Rights to
mental integrity and neural freedom.
Sources:
· UNESCO Recommendation on Neurotechnology (2024);
· OECD Neurotechnology Guidelines (2023);
· Yale Neurorights Initiative.
Emerging rights:
· right to cognitive liberty;
· right to neural integrity;
· right to protection from manipulation.
Chapter XII defines neurolaw regulation as a system of norms protecting mental integrity and cognitive autonomy of digital persons. Advances in neural networks, brain–computer interfaces, and AI create risks to personal freedom requiring specific legal safeguards.
· UNESCO Recommendation on Neurotechnology (2024) — ethical framework for neurotechnology use.
· OECD Neurotechnology Guidelines (2023) — standards for cognitive autonomy and neural data protection.
· Yale Neurorights Initiative — doctrine of emerging neurorights.
1. cognitive liberty;
2. neural integrity;
3. protection from technological manipulation.
· integration of neurorights into DIP governance algorithms;
· enforcement through polycentric governance;
· reliance on international law and ethical standards;
· monitoring and response mechanisms for violations.
Neurolaw establishes a paradigm in which technology is subordinated to ethics and international law, making neurorights a cornerstone of digital sovereignty.
Essence: Mechanisms for
transitioning individuals into digital jurisdiction.
International references:
· legal personality of international organizations (ICJ);
· special legal regimes (World Bank, IMF);
· digital citizenship models (Estonia, South Korea).
The DIP becomes an alternative form of social contract.
Chapter XIII outlines mechanisms integrating individuals into digital jurisdiction, enabling digital sovereignty and forming a new legal framework for interaction with DPIs and the DIP.
· autonomy of the digital person;
· voluntary digital citizenship;
· polycentric decentralization;
· compliance with international standards.
The DIP emerges as an alternative social contract integrating rights, ethical algorithms, and international norms.
Essence: Regulation of
AI, biotechnology, and autonomous systems risks.
Sources: UN GGE, OECD AI Principles, ISO AI risk standards, UN
cybersecurity norms.
This chapter establishes frameworks for safe, accountable technological adaptation.
Essence: Digital
equalization of opportunities.
Sources: SDG 2030 Agenda, UN Tax Committee, OECD BEPS &
Digital Taxation.
Digital economy creates surplus value that must be distributed fairly.
Chapter XV establishes a legal and institutional foundation for a digital justice model, ensuring equitable access to opportunities and shared digital value—one of the core mechanisms for reducing global inequality in the digital era.
DIGITAL REGULATION
Part V outlines the fundamental principles of a new type of global governance emerging in the digital age, which complements—and in certain areas surpasses—traditional models of state and interstate regulation. By revealing the legal nature of digital institutions, this Part demonstrates how digital infrastructure, algorithms, polycentric mechanisms, and global ethical standards form new international legal regimes based on transparency, accountability, and the participation of every digital person.
The sections analyze four key domains that define the
transformation of the global order:
(1) philanthropy as a structural element of digital institutional architecture;
(2) a new system of international security based on polycentric digital
mechanisms and norms of cyber law;
(3) the ending of perpetual wars through algorithmic mediation, digital
participation, and sustainable development;
(4) overcoming the climate crisis through digital tools of monitoring,
governance, and responsibility.
This Part is grounded in the UN Charter, norms of international humanitarian and cyber law, and the recommendations of the OECD, UN OCHA, UNFCCC, IPCC, UNDP, and other international doctrinal and practical sources. All these documents demonstrate that digital institutions are no longer auxiliary instruments but full-fledged subjects of global governance.
In conclusion, digital regulation is described as a new paradigm of the international legal order, in which digital society is capable of ensuring stability, conflict resolution, global solidarity, and climate resilience through new institutional mechanisms and algorithmic decision-making models. This constitutes one of the key elements of a future intersocietal contract, ending the dominance of the era of perpetual wars and opening the path toward technologically enabled peace and sustainable development.
Essence: Philanthropy becomes part of digital institutional architecture.
International Sources:
• UN OCHA Principles
• ICRC Humanitarian Principles
• International NGO Law (ICNL Standards)
Digital philanthropy is an element of a global solidarity mechanism.
In this chapter, philanthropy is considered not as a private initiative of individuals or organizations, but as a structural element of digital institutional architecture integrated into the Digital Institutional Platform (DIP).
It is transformed into a digital mechanism of global solidarity operating on the principles of transparency, universality, and accountability.
In digital society, philanthropy becomes:
• not optional behavior, but an institutional norm;
• not merely resource redistribution, but part of a digital social contract;
• not only humanitarian action, but a legal procedure for supporting integrated
public welfare.
UN OCHA Principles
The principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence form the
foundation for ensuring that digital philanthropy mechanisms comply with international
humanitarian standards. Within the DIP, these principles are adapted to digital
models of automated oversight, transaction transparency, and needs
verification.
ICRC Humanitarian Principles
These principles deepen the legal nature of digital philanthropy, ensuring it
cannot serve as a tool of political influence or discrimination. In the digital
environment, this means:
• non-discriminatory access to aid;
• equal treatment of all digital persons;
• protection of humanitarian flows from political or corporate interference.
International NGO Law (ICNL Standards)
International legal standards ensure:
• the freedom to establish digital philanthropic institutions;
• cross-border transfer of funds for humanitarian purposes;
• protection from arbitrary state restrictions.
This creates the legal foundation for digital philanthropic DPIs as new types
of international non-state institutions.
Existing international practice already includes forms of
digitalized philanthropy:
• UN humanitarian platforms (Humanitarian Data Exchange);
• digital aid wallets (WFP Building Blocks);
• blockchain-based transparency models (UNICEF CryptoFund).
Chapter XVI institutionalizes these elements, transforming them into a normative mechanism of digital society independent of the will of individual states or corporations.
Humanitarian and international social law doctrine
increasingly interprets philanthropy as part of global solidarity-based
governance. In digital society, this function is strengthened through:
• automated contributions by digital persons;
• solidarity funds formed by DPIs;
• algorithmic transparency;
• effectiveness ensured through ethical needs monitoring.
Chapter XVI demonstrates that:
1. Philanthropy is a legal institution, not a voluntary phenomenon.
2. It possesses international legal principles, standards, and obligations.
3. It is integrated into the DIP as:
o a redistribution mechanism;
o an element of the social contract;
o an instrument of post-conflict development;
o part of the new international security system.
4. Digital philanthropy is a functional analogue of international humanitarian assistance, modernized through digital infrastructure, polycentric governance, and algorithmic accountability.
Chapter XVI shows that digital society establishes not only new forms of economy but also a new ethical architecture of global solidarity rooted in international law and digital governance mechanisms. This institution is a necessary component of a new international order in which philanthropy is not an exception but a structural function of civilization.
Essence: International security is reimagined through polycentric institutions.
Foundations:
• UN Charter, Chapters VI–VII
• UN Digital Diplomacy Framework
• Tallinn Manual on cyber conflicts
• Paris Call Principles of trust and cyber stability
Digital society becomes a global factor in the new international security system.
Chapter XVII establishes the fundamental conclusion of the entire architecture of digital society: sustainable peace is possible only through the creation of new supranational institutions capable of balancing the interests of states, digital communities, and the global economy—analogous to how the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) became the foundation of lasting peace in post-war Europe.
This thesis holds not only political but also international legal significance.
Europe did not achieve peace through declarations; peace emerged because key war-related resources were placed under joint management by a supranational authority.
Legally, this meant:
• limitation of state sovereignty over coal and steel;
• establishment of a body with binding decisions;
• common rules preventing hidden war preparation.
This was an institutional guarantee of peace, not a political one. Digital society replicates this principle at a higher level—through digital institutions governing economic, social, and security processes.
Digital institutionalization establishes shared rules, processes, standards, and decentralized oversight mechanisms that:
a) Prevent hidden aggression through transparent digital supply chains, common cybersecurity protocols, and polycentric monitoring via DPIs.
b) Reduce geopolitical entropy by forming a global economic fabric through shared digital standards, digital property, cross-border contracts, and polycentric arbitration.
c) Create a new type of economic interdependence where data, algorithms, and digital infrastructure replace coal and steel as foundational resources.
Chapter XVII relies on:
• the UN Charter (peaceful settlement and collective security);
• the UN Digital Diplomacy Framework;
• the Tallinn Manual;
• the Paris principles of cyber stability.
These documents confirm that international law is already moving toward digital peace institutions but requires a systemic solution—precisely what digital society provides.
The era of perpetual wars can end only when security is built on a balance of institutions, not power. Digital society ensures transparency, minimizes escalation risks, removes incentives for conflict, and creates shared governance standards—making war irrational.
Essence: Algorithmic mediation, digital participation, and sustainable development project governance.
Sources:
• UN Peacemaking & Mediation Guidelines
• OSCE Conflict Prevention Mechanisms
• UNDP Digital Peacebuilding
Digital institutions eliminate geopolitical entropy.
Chapter XVIII concludes that wars result not only from political decisions but from systemic entropy, lack of transparency, and institutional incapacity to absorb conflicts. Digital society introduces an institutional-algorithmic model capable of permanent prevention, dynamic mediation, and digital governance of peace and development projects.
These guidelines affirm that modern peacemaking must be:
• inclusive;
• structural;
• based on sustainable development;
• linked to early warning and long-term planning.
Digital institutions implement all of these principles by transforming them from recommendations into embedded functions of the digital peace infrastructure.
These mechanisms emphasize:
• escalation prevention;
• transparency;
• immediate transmission of conflict signals.
Within the Digital Institutional Platform (DIP), such mechanisms become automated polycentric protocols that detect anomalies and conflict triggers in real time.
UNDP recognizes that digital mediation and civic participation
are key tools for conflict prevention.
Within digital society, the concept of digital peacebuilding is
elevated to a higher level—algorithmic mediation and digital participation
implemented through polycentric institutions.
Algorithmic mediation is not merely a technology. It
represents a new format of international law in which:
• digital institutions identify the onset of conflict processes;
• algorithms propose neutral de-escalation scenarios;
• sustainable development models assess long-term consequences;
• polycentric actors (states, organizations, digital persons) operate under
coordinated response procedures.
Algorithms do not replace diplomacy—they eliminate the space
for manipulation and incomplete information, which are the primary sources of
conflict.
This creates, for the first time, the conditions for permanent diplomacy rather
than reactive diplomacy.
Wars often arise due to:
• lack of trust;
• unequal access to information;
• political opacity;
• the inability of societies to influence strategic decision-making.
Digital participation within the DIP ensures:
• transparent digital deliberation;
• algorithmic alignment of interests;
• digital plebiscites on critically important issues;
• global public legitimacy of peace decisions.
As a result, digital participation renders wars not only undesirable but politically impossible, as it removes the traditional monopoly of elites over decisions of war and peace.
Sustainability is the foundation of peace.
States that derive shared benefits—investments, infrastructure, integrated
supply chains—lose the economic incentives for armed conflict.
Digital DPIs:
• plan interstate projects;
• ensure transparent monitoring;
• guarantee contract enforcement;
• eliminate mistrust regarding resource flows.
Sustainable development projects in digital institutional form become beacons of stability that extinguish the potential for conflict.
Geopolitical entropy consists of unbalanced interests, unresolved claims, opaque resource flows, informational manipulation, and technological asymmetries.
Digital institutions eliminate geopolitical entropy through:
• transparency of algorithms and resource data;
• shared governance institutions (analogous to the ECSC, but global);
• unified security standards;
• polycentric accountability;
• synchronized digital decisions;
• shared development models.
As a result, the international system ceases to be chaotic and becomes regulated, predictable, and symmetrical.
Chapter XVIII demonstrates that no traditional diplomatic format can independently ensure lasting peace, as it fails to eliminate the structural causes of conflict.
Only digital society, in the form of polycentric institutions,
is capable of:
• neutralizing risks;
• preventing escalation;
• ensuring transparency;
• building digital trust;
• aligning interests through sustainable development.
This makes possible what humanity has sought for centuries—the end of the era of perpetual wars and the transition to a system of predictable digital peace.
Essence: Digital technologies as the foundation of climate responsibility.
International Instruments:
• Paris Agreement (2015);
• UNFCCC Reports;
• IPCC Digital Monitoring Standards.
Digital infrastructure becomes an instrument of climate governance.
Chapter XIX addresses one of the most fundamental challenges of the 21st century—the ability of humanity to adequately respond to climate disasters, the consequences of global warming, and the expanding spectrum of natural risks.
Digital society proposes a qualitatively new model of climate governance in which digital infrastructure, transparent data, and algorithmic protocols become the primary instruments for fulfilling international obligations and preventing the most destructive scenarios.
• Establishes the architecture of global climate
responsibility.
• Requires transparent reporting, monitoring, verification, and international
coordination.
Digital society transforms these requirements into automated digital infrastructure, minimizing the human factor and political manipulation.
Continuously emphasize the need to improve data accuracy, create integrated platforms, and modernize measurement systems.
As a platform of digital jurisdiction, the DIP ensures this
through:
• unified international data protocols;
• open digital registries;
• neuroblockchain technologies guaranteeing data integrity.
The IPCC already recognizes that digital tools are essential
for:
• disaster forecasting;
• emissions measurement;
• climate scenario modeling.
Digital infrastructure integrated into DPIs institutionally çàêðåïëþº these standards as part of the new international climate system.
Traditional climate policy suffers from:
• data fragmentation;
• inequality in access to technology;
• political cycles that undermine long-term solutions;
• lack of transparent accountability.
The Digital Institutional Platform resolves these problems through:
• Neurochain verification of climate data,
ensuring immutability and transparency;
• Digital risk maps, synchronized global models providing
early disaster warnings;
• Algorithmic response protocols, through which DPIs
automatically activate:
– humanitarian mobilization protocols;
– cross-border resource coordination;
– financing via the DIP digital economy;
• A system of digital accountability of states and corporations,
enabled by digital verification and open registries.
This section highlights a key principle:
digital property and digital contribution form the basis of a new climate economic
model.
• Data on climate innovations are recorded as digital assets;
• Participation of digital persons in green projects is rewarded;
• Environmental services become elements of the DIP economy;
• Digital tokens are used to finance adaptation and mitigation.
Thus, climate solutions cease to be costs and become mechanisms of growth and resilience for digital civilization.
Climate disasters are no longer merely environmental issues
but factors of:
• global security;
• migration pressure;
• economic collapse;
• social instability;
• armed conflicts (climate-driven conflict triggers).
Digital infrastructure functions as an early international warning system, just as the digital security system in Chapter XVII prevents military conflicts.
Together, these chapters demonstrate that:
without digital institutions, climate risks are unmanageable;
with digital institutions, they become predictable and governable.
Chapter XIX demonstrates that:
• climate disasters are not natural but institutional problems;
• the current system of international law lacks effective tools to address
them;
• the Digital Institutional Platform creates a new architecture of climate
governance that ensures:
o data accuracy;
o global coordination;
o transparency;
o equitable responsibility;
o timely response;
o impact forecasting.
This chapter confirms that only a digitally institutionalized society can ensure the survival of civilization in an era of climate upheaval—just as Chapter XVIII confirms that only digital society can end perpetual wars.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Part VI is devoted to a fundamental element of the new digital civilization—Artificial Intelligence as an institutional, legal, and ethical category, rather than merely a technological instrument. It defines the framework in which AI becomes a component of digital law, digital sovereignty, polycentric institutions, and global stability governance.
In this Part, AI is not regarded as an autonomous agent, but as a delegated component of the will of the digital person and digital society, integrated into the regulatory, security, and ethical mechanisms of the Digital Institutional Platform (DIP).
Part VI is structurally based on a set of contemporary international instruments that form a universal framework for the ethical and legal existence of AI:
● OECD AI Principles (2019)
The first universal set of principles: transparency, robustness,
accountability, human control, and fairness.
● UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of
Artificial Intelligence (2021)
Defines a code of ethical governance, protection of human rights, and
prevention of discrimination and algorithmic abuse.
● Council of Europe – Convention on AI, Human
Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (2024)
Establishes a legal basis for accountability in the use of AI by States Parties.
● ISO/IEC AI Risk Management Standards
Provide a technical basis for assessing and mitigating risks posed by
autonomous systems.
● UN GGE and OEWG on AI and Autonomous Systems
in Security and Cyberspace
Formulate norms of behavior regarding the use of AI in international security
and defense.
All these documents demonstrate that artificial
intelligence has already become part of international public law,
although not yet fully codified.
Part VI proposes such codification within the framework of the DIP.
Within the concept of digital society, AI performs three fundamental roles:
AI does not possess autonomous legal personality—all its decisions are legally attributed to a Polycentric Institution (PI) and a digital person.
This ensures:
• elimination of anonymity;
• prevention of uncontrolled autonomous actions;
• direct accountability of the person for the outcomes of actions performed by
their AI agent.
This principle reflects the international human-in-command standard enshrined in UN GGE documents.
AI becomes part of:
• moderation of digital institutions;
• algorithmic governance;
• automated control of digital assets;
• systems for the execution of digital contracts;
• risk forecasting models.
This embodies the principle of algorithmic accountability, recognized by the OECD and UNESCO.
In previous Parts (new peace, ending perpetual wars, climate
disasters), AI functions as:
• a mediation tool;
• an analytical early-warning mechanism;
• a system for coordinating international actions;
• a resource allocation module.
Here, AI performs the role of a digital institutional "nervous system."
Part VI legally establishes several core provisions:
• AI is not an autonomous person, but a digital
instrument
The absence of legal personality safeguards against the creation of
uncontrolled or "irresponsible" agents.
• Each AI agent is linked to a Polycentric Institution
This prevents algorithms from escaping jurisdiction.
• All AI decisions are subject to a transparency log
Neuro-blockchain technology creates an evidentiary chain of all algorithmic
actions.
• AI is subordinated to the ethical core of the DIP
OECD and UNESCO standards are integrated into the internal legal system of the
digital person.
• Prohibition of uncontrolled autonomous systems
This corresponds to international approaches to LAWS (Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems), but is extended to the broader civil, economic, and
social domains.
Within the concept of digital society, AI is not a threat but a tool for preventing threats:
• it helps avoid conflicts;
• stabilizes global systems and chains;
• assists in managing climate risks;
• supervises digital institutions, preventing abuse;
• supports fair distribution of resources.
This develops the core thesis:
institutionalized, ethically regulated AI is the foundation of
civilizational stability in digital society.
Part VI emphasizes that in the 21st century AI becomes the same driver of social change that, in the 20th century, was represented by:
• electricity;
• nuclear energy;
• telecommunications;
• computing systems.
Unlike previous technologies, AI is capable of:
• modeling the future;
• making optimal decisions;
• scaling diplomacy;
• coordinating civilizational goals.
Therefore, Part VI formalizes AI as an institutional element of the new social contract—the digital contract.
Part VI establishes legal, ethical, and institutional foundations that ensure:
✔
controllability of AI
✔ algorithmic transparency
✔ accountability of digital persons
✔ integration of AI into the digital security system
✔ stability and predictability of global processes
Thus, this Part demonstrates that AI in digital society is not a threat but a guarantor of security, development, and civilizational resilience, provided that it is embedded within the institutional architecture of the DIP and governed by ethical and legal standards.
Sources:
• UNESCO AI Ethics (2021)
• OECD AI Principles
• EU AI Act (ethical framework)
AI becomes a co-participant in the institutional process.
This Chapter defines the role of AI as an active participant in the institutional life of digital society, where it is integrated into the self-organization mechanisms of polycentric institutions. AI does not act autonomously in a legal sense, but performs delegated functions of digital persons and PIs, ensuring efficiency, coordination, and predictability of processes.
• UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial
Intelligence (2021) — establishes ethical standards for AI use,
including accountability and transparency.
• OECD AI Principles — define principles of reliability,
safety, and ethical use of AI, forming the basis for self-organizing systems.
• EU AI Act (ethical framework) — sets requirements for
algorithmic transparency, explainability of decisions, and prevention of harm,
integrated into polycentric structures.
AI becomes an "institutional agent" that performs governance and regulatory functions within digital institutions, supporting self-organization without violating the sovereignty of digital persons.
Decisions made by AI are always linked to a specific PI or digital person, ensuring legal accountability and transparency.
AI self-organization algorithms are implemented within the
structure of the DIP, ensuring:
o management of digital assets and revenues;
o coordination of polycentric institutions;
o control over compliance with ethical algorithms and rules of digital law.
AI is used for early risk detection, modeling the consequences of decisions, and optimizing processes within digital society.
• Human-in-command principle (UN GGE) — AI
does not replace the human but operates under human control.
• Accountability and transparency (OECD, EU AI Act) — provide
the legal foundation for self-organizing algorithmic systems.
• Rights of the digital person and PIs — AI may not violate
digital rights; it only facilitates their realization.
Chapter XX demonstrates that self-organization in digital society is possible only through the integration of ethically regulated AI into polycentric institutions, where it performs a coordination and analytical role while maintaining legal accountability and ensuring the stability of digital society.
Sources:
· ISO/IEC AI Governance Standards
· OECD Framework for AI Risk
· UN Global Digital Compact
The DIP forms an algorithmic constitution.
Essence:
This Section defines the principles and mechanisms of artificial intelligence governance within the Digital Institutional Platform (DIP). AI is integrated into the digital architecture as an instrument of algorithmic governance, forecasting, control, and coordination of the activities of digital persons and polycentric institutions. Governance is exercised through digital law rules and ethical algorithms, forming the "algorithmic constitution" of the DIP.
· ISO/IEC AI Governance Standards — standards for AI risk management, ensuring transparency and accountability.
· OECD Framework for AI Risk Management — principles for assessing and mitigating technological risks implemented in polycentric systems.
· UN Global Digital Compact (2024, draft) — a framework for responsible digital development and governance of innovative technologies.
1. Algorithmic Constitution of the DIP
The DIP establishes the rules governing AI operation, including the rights of
digital persons, delegated authorities, and algorithmic limitations.
2. Monitoring and Control
AI is subject to continuous monitoring through audit mechanisms, transparent
decision logs, and algorithmic reports, ensuring legal accountability.
3. Risk-Oriented Governance
All innovative technologies are assessed on a risk scale concerning the
sovereignty of digital persons, the security of the DIP, and international
obligations.
4. Accountability to Digital Persons and DPIs
Every AI decision is recorded within the DIP structure, while final
responsibility remains with the digital person or polycentric institution that
delegated the function.
· Human Oversight Principle (OECD, ISO) — AI functions solely as an instrument under the control of digital persons or DPIs.
· Transparency and Explainability (EU AI Act, UNESCO AI Ethics) — all algorithms must be explainable and comprehensible to oversight institutions.
· Digital Sovereignty (UN GDC) — AI governance within the DIP may not infringe the rights of sovereign digital persons.
Section XXI emphasizes that AI governance in the digital society operates through a structured, ethically regulated algorithmic system that balances automation, the rights of digital persons, and international security norms. The DIP becomes an "algorithmic constitution" defining the rules of digital life and the interaction of innovative technologies.
Sources:
· UN GGE Reports on Autonomous Weapons
· ICRC Position on Autonomous Systems
· Principle of Meaningful Human Control
Core Principle:
No system may make decisions determining human destiny without a human.
This Section establishes principles and mechanisms for AI governance within the Digital Institutional Platform (DIP). AI is integrated into the digital architecture as an instrument of algorithmic governance, forecasting, control, and coordination of digital persons and polycentric institutions. Governance is implemented through digital law rules and ethical algorithms, forming the "algorithmic constitution" of the DIP.
· ISO/IEC AI Governance Standards — AI risk management, transparency, and accountability standards consistent with general digital law principles.
· OECD Framework for AI Risk Management — principles for assessing and mitigating technological risks integrated into polycentric systems to ensure digital environment security.
· UN Global Digital Compact (2024, draft) — a framework for responsible digital development defining the rights of digital persons and the obligations of DPIs.
1. Algorithmic Constitution of the DIP
The DIP establishes patterns and replications governing AI operation, including
the rights of digital persons, delegated authorities, and algorithmic
constraints.
2. Monitoring and Control
AI is subject to continuous monitoring through audits, transparent decision
logs, and algorithmic reports, ensuring legal controllability and traceability.
3. Risk-Oriented Governance
All innovative technologies are assessed against risks to digital person
sovereignty, DIP security, and compliance with international obligations
(Tallinn Manual, UN Cyber Norms).
4. Accountability to Digital Persons and DPIs
Each AI decision is recorded within the DIP structure; final responsibility
remains with the digital person or polycentric institution that delegated the
function.
· Human Oversight Principle (OECD, ISO) — AI acts solely as an instrument under the control of digital persons or DPIs, consistent with accountability principles.
· Transparency and Explainability (EU AI Act, UNESCO AI Ethics) — algorithms must be explainable and accessible for oversight and audit by digital society institutions.
· Digital Sovereignty (UN GDC) — AI governance within the DIP may not violate the rights of sovereign digital persons; any automated decision must be legally linked to a specific digital subject.
Section XXI demonstrates that AI governance in the digital society must be conducted through a structured, ethically regulated algorithmic system that balances automation, digital person rights, and international security norms. The DIP functions as an "algorithmic constitution," defining digital life rules and integrating innovative technologies into a polycentric institutional architecture.
INTERNATIONAL INTERACTION
The Digital Society (DS) forms a unique international jurisdiction integrating sovereign digital persons, Digital Polycentric Institutions (DPIs), and the Digital Institutional Platform (DIP). It operates as an analogue of the European Union, where instead of member states, digital persons and their institutions act as subjects, and legislative, executive, and judicial functions are implemented through the algorithmic constitution of the DIP.
|
Characteristic |
European Union |
Digital Society |
|
Subjects |
Member States |
Sovereign Digital Persons, DPIs |
|
Legislation |
European Parliament, Council of the EU |
Algorithmic Constitution of the DIP, Ethical Algorithms |
|
Executive Power |
European Commission |
Digital Institutions, Delegated AI Algorithms |
|
Judicial Jurisdiction |
Court of Justice of the EU |
Digital Arbitration and DPI Self-Regulation Mechanisms |
|
Integration Goal |
Economic, political, and social harmonization |
Personal sovereignty, digital rights, global sustainable development projects |
|
Control Mechanisms |
Compliance monitoring, political sanctions |
Algorithm audits, transparent logs, digital accountability |
1. Digital Polycentric Institutions (DPIs)
o Act as legal and organizational entities implementing the rights and obligations of digital persons within defined functional jurisdictions.
o Perform the role of global-scale "ministries" or agencies coordinating projects, digital asset management, and social programs (CPI, digital property).
2. Digital Institutional Platform (DIP)
o The central "framework" of jurisdiction defining algorithmic governance rules, accountability, digital law, and ethical algorithms.
o Ensures balance between the autonomy of digital persons and functional coordination of DPIs.
3. International Hub for Sustainable Development Project Management
o Acts as a global process "integrator," analogous to the EU’s role in coordinating member state policies.
o Ensures legitimacy, audit, and coordination of projects in the global digital economy and security architecture.
· ICJ practice and international organizations — define the legal personality of new institutions.
· UN Charter and Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties — formal foundations for creating international structures.
· OECD Digital Governance Principles, UN Global Digital Compact — standards of transparent digital governance and interaction.
· EU Digital Law and GDPR as benchmarks — provide the foundation for protecting digital person rights and data.
Principle:
The Digital Society constitutes an autonomous international jurisdiction where
digital persons and DPIs interact through algorithmic-legal mechanisms
consistent with international law and ensuring global coordination—analogous to
EU integration processes, but at the level of individuals and digital
institutions.
The Digital Society:
· Creates a new form of international jurisdiction where digital persons and DPIs, rather than states, are the primary legal subjects.
· Ensures polycentric governance, algorithmic accountability, and personal sovereignty.
· Integrates economic, social, and security projects through the International Hub for Sustainable Development Project Management.
· Serves as a legal and organizational model enabling peace, sustainable development, and effective global governance in the digital age.
Foundations:
· International law of international organizations (Vienna Convention, 1986)
· Practice of recognition of new subjects
· Global frameworks of digital diplomacy
The DIP can be recognized by states as an institutional jurisdiction, and digital persons as participants in international relations.
This Section defines the mechanisms for integrating digital persons and polycentric institutions into global processes of international interaction. Particular emphasis is placed on preserving personal sovereignty in the context of transnational cooperation and the management of global sustainable development projects. The creation of a new international organization—the International Hub for Sustainable Development Project Management—serves as an instrument for legitimate coordination of such projects and the integration of digital institutions into the international system.
· UN Charter (Chapters I, VI, VII) — framework for the creation and operation of international organizations supporting peace, security, and development.
· Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) — legal basis for international treaties and agreements that establish organizational structures.
· ICJ Advisory Opinions and Reparation for Injuries Case — legal doctrine on the legal personality of international organizations.
· UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, 2015) — benchmarks for global coordination of sustainable development projects.
· OECD Digital Governance Principles — standards for transparent and accountable interaction between international organizations and digital institutions.
1. Personal Sovereignty in International Cooperation
o Each digital person retains autonomous control over their data, identity, and participation in projects, even when implemented internationally.
o Delegation of authority occurs through DPIs, with formal recording of responsibility and legal guarantees.
2. Creation of the International Hub for Sustainable Development Project Management
o The Hub functions as a new type of international organization, integrating polycentric institutions and digital persons into a system coordinating global projects.
o The Hub ensures legitimacy, resource oversight, and legal accountability of participants.
3. International Interaction and Treaty Framework
o All projects are implemented based on international agreements and the internal algorithmic constitution of the DIP.
o Mechanisms for monitoring, auditing, and reporting are established to ensure accountability and transparency.
· Principle of Polycentric Governance (Elinor Ostrom, IGO sui generis) — integration of multiple levels of governance: digital persons → polycentric institutions → International Hub.
· Digital Sovereignty and Accountability — all actions of digital persons in international projects are carried out through legal instruments and algorithmic accountability.
· Global Coordination of Sustainable Development — the Hub acts as a tool for achieving SDG objectives, managing resources, and resolving conflicts.
Section XXIII emphasizes that the sovereignty of digital persons and international cooperation are fully compatible through structured polycentric mechanisms. The International Hub for Sustainable Development Project Management becomes the core of a new global system, where digital institutions and digital persons interact within a legal framework, achieving sustainable development goals, ensuring peace, security, and adaptation to global challenges.